Fregean themes in the TractatusContext, compositionality, and nonsense

  1. Eduardo Pérez-Navarro 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Journal:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Year of publication: 2021

Issue Title: The significance of the Tractatus

Volume: 40

Issue: 2

Pages: 117-132

Type: Article

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More publications in: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to argue for the new Wittgensteinians’ claim that Frege and Wittgenstein share a contextualist attitude with respect to the individuation of content and, as a result, an austere conception of nonsense. To do this, I offer alternative interpretations of the passages of the Tractatus in which Wittgenstein seems committed to the attitude opposed to contextualism — compositionalism.

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