The role of the Ascribee's representations in belief ascriptions
- 1 Universidad de Granada, Departamento de Filosofía Icultad de Filo
ISSN: 0210-1602
Ano de publicación: 2017
Volume: 36
Número: 1
Páxinas: 113-125
Tipo: Artigo
Outras publicacións en: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía
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