Sobre las nociones de lógica y argumento de John Stuart Mill
ISSN: 1132-0877, 2255-596X
Ano de publicación: 2015
Título do exemplar: SIEU 2014 Seminario Internacional. 26-27 Junio 2014. Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, España
Volume: 20
Número: 1
Páxinas: 51-68
Tipo: Artigo
Outras publicacións en: Telos: Revista iberoamericana de estudios utilitaristas
Resumo
My aim in this paper is to discuss Mill’s notions of logic and argument and to highlight the epistemic dimension that for Mill has every argument and that, it is in the light of this epistemic dimension, that an argument should be assessed. By taking into account these considerations, I focus on his criticism against deductive arguments to the effect that they commit the fallacy of begging the question. I try to show that this idea relies on his radical empiricism and argue that he is wrong. He particularly fails to recognize how we can gain knowledge from deductive arguments, though their conclusions are already contained in the premises. Finally, I point out the fact that, by his insisting in the epistemic dimension of arguments, Mill’s ideas are closer to those of argumentative theorists.
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