Igualitarismo, igualación a la baja, antropocentrismo y valor de la vida

  1. Horta Álvarez, Óscar
Revista:
Revista de filosofía

ISSN: 0034-8244 1988-284X

Ano de publicación: 2010

Número: 35

Páxinas: 133-152

Tipo: Artigo

Outras publicacións en: Revista de filosofía

Resumo

El igualitarismo axiológico defiende que una situación mejora al menos en algún respecto si el valor que contiene es distribuido más igualitariamente. En este artículo defiendo esta forma de igualitarismo y apunto algunos de sus corolarios. Tras considerar y rechazar la objeción de la igualación a la baja, sostengo que del igualitarismo se sigue un cuestionamiento de la consideración meramente maximizadota del valor de la vida. Argumento, asimismo, que esta posición objeta a la concepciones antropocéntricas del valor.

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