Igualitarismo, igualación a la baja, antropocentrismo y valor de la vida

  1. Horta Álvarez, Óscar
Journal:
Revista de filosofía

ISSN: 0034-8244 1988-284X

Year of publication: 2010

Issue: 35

Pages: 133-152

Type: Article

More publications in: Revista de filosofía

Abstract

Axiological egalitarianism claims that an outcome improves at least in some respect if the value it contains is more evenly distributed. In this paper I defend this form of egalitarianism and identify some of its corollaries. First, I consider and reject the levelling down objection. I then point out that egalitarianism casts doubt on the traditional view of the value of life in terms of maximization. Further, I argue that this theory also questions anthropocentric conceptions of value.

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