Análisis de las características psicométricas y estructura factorial del "Cuestionario de Actitudes hacia la Negociación" (CAN)

  1. Rodríguez Fernández, M. Dámaso
  2. Serrano Martínez, Gonzalo
Journal:
Revista de psicología del trabajo y de las organizaciones = Journal of work and organizational psychology

ISSN: 1576-5962

Year of publication: 1991

Volume: 7

Issue: 18

Pages: 13-24

Type: Article

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More publications in: Revista de psicología del trabajo y de las organizaciones = Journal of work and organizational psychology

Abstract

This paper presents a device to measure the attitude supported by negotiators towards negotiation as on oppropiote process for conflict management, the "Cuestionario de Actitudes hacia lo Negociación " (CAN). In addition to setting up a diagnosis of the attitudinal structure between the parts, CAN allows us to measure the negotiating climate, to make predictions obout the development of interaction and to endow us with appropiate mechanisms of intervention. It shows an empirical fitness of the resulting factors of the study, carried out running the CAN with 82 effective negotiators, with regard to theoretical dimensions proposed in Walton & McKersie's model (1965) and to the recommendations about the use of strategies and tactics stemmed from Pruitt's model (1983). It also proves a high internal consistency (a = . 88) and reliability (r = .73).

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