Analyzing the Zerkani Network with the Owen Value

  1. Algaba, Encarnación 1
  2. Prieto, Andrea 2
  3. Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro 4
  4. Hamers, Herbert 3
  1. 1 Matemática Aplicada II and Instituto de Matemáticas de la Universidad de Sevilla, Sevilla, Spain
  2. 2 Matemática Aplicada II, Escuela Superior de Ingenieros, Camino de los Descubrimientos, Sevilla, Spain
  3. 3 CentER, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research and TIAS Business School, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
  4. 4 Departamento de Estatística, Análise Matemática e Optimización, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain
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Libro:
Studies in Choice and Welfare

ISSN: 1614-0311,  2197-8530

ISBN: 9783031216954,  9783031216961

Ano de publicación: 2023

Páxinas: 225-242

Tipo: Capítulo de libro

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_14 GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso aberto editor

Resumo

This paper introduces a new centrality measure based on the Owen value to rank members in covert networks. In particular, we consider the Zerkani network responsible for the Paris attack of November 2015 and the Brussels attack of March 2016. We follow the line of research introduced in Hamers et al. [Handbook of the Shapley value. Taylor and Francis Group: CRC Press, pp 463–481 (2019)]. First, we consider two different appropriate cooperative games defined on the Zerkani network. Both games take into account the strengths of the links between its members and the individual contribution of its members. Second, for each game the Owen value is calculated, that provides a ranking of the members in the Zerkani network. For this calculation, we need to create a suitable partition of the members in the network, and, subsequently, we will use the approximation method introduced in Saavedra-Nieves et al. [The mathematics of the uncertain: A tribute to Pedro Gil. Springer, pp 347–356 (2018)]. Moreover, we can provide specific error bounds for the approximation of the Owen value. Finally, the obtained rankings are compared to the rankings established in Hamers et al. [Handbook of the Shapley value. Taylor and Francis Group: CRC Press, pp 463–481 (2019)].

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