Practice-based versus pragmatic approaches to logical constants
- Concha Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.)
- José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.)
- José M. Sagüillo (dir. congr.)
- Víctor M. Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.)
- Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.)
Editorial: Servicio de Publicaciones e Intercambio Científico ; Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
ISBN: 978-84-9887-939-1
Ano de publicación: 2012
Páxinas: 674-681
Congreso: Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Congreso (7. 2012. Santiago de Compostela)
Tipo: Achega congreso
Resumo
There is a sense in which practice-based approaches could be considered pragmatic approaches; namely and trivially, practice-based approaches take practices into account. But, given some existing characterizations of practice-based approaches, not all pragmatic approaches are practice-based. In the following, I intend to illustrate the problem by showing that Frapolli’s pragmatic approach to the characterization of logical constants is not practice-based. I will start by typifying both practice-based and pragmatic approaches, and continue by applying those characterizations to Frapolli’s proposal, and to the so-called view of logic as model (Corcoran 1973; Shapiro 2001;Martínez-Vidal 2004). My contentions will be: 1) that the view of logic as model is a practiced-based approach, while Frapolli’s pragmatic approach is not; 2) that pragmatic approaches cannot be trivially identified with practice-based ones.