Actitudes cognitivasel caso de la asunción, particularmente en ciencia
- Concha Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.)
- José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.)
- José M. Sagüillo (dir. congr.)
- Víctor M. Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.)
- Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.)
Editorial: Servicio de Publicaciones e Intercambio Científico ; Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
ISBN: 978-84-9887-939-1
Ano de publicación: 2012
Páxinas: 396-402
Congreso: Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Congreso (7. 2012. Santiago de Compostela)
Tipo: Achega congreso
Resumo
After considering the topic of assumptions as presented by Meinong (1902/1910), we analyze the case of the assumptions in science and propose scientific assumptions as the antecedent of a subjunctive (counterfactual) conditional. This analysis is consistent with Meinong’s, where assumptions are not considered to be judgments. For Meinong, “hypothetical judgments” are assumptions rather than judgments (Meinong sees assumptions as something different from judgments). Our analysis also allows to include mere hypotheses as a limiting case, because in this case the conditional would be merely subjunctive (and not strictly counterfactual). Thus, in our analysis, assumptions could be either (i) purely hypothetical, or (ii) counterfactual (in the strictest sense of the antecedent is not satisfied). Thus, the hypothesis would not be considered judgments, but statements of the form “act as if it were true and see the consequences”. This sense seems entirely consistent with the normal use of hypotheses in scientific practice.