Substructural logics and pragmatic enrichment

Resumo

In this dissertation, we argue for a Pragmatic Logical Pluralism, a pluralist thesis about logic which endorses Classical, Relevant, Linear, and Ordered logic. We justify that the formal languages of these four logics are legitimate codifications of the logical vocabulary and capture legitimate senses of logical consequence. This will be justified given a particular interpretation of the four formal languages: logical consequence and conditional, disjunction, and conjunction of the four different logics codify different and legitimate senses of `follows from', `if...then', `or' and `and' which diverge in their different pragmatic enrichments. The dissertation is twofold. First, we will explore the effect that the lack of structural rules has on logical connectives, in four substructural logics, and its connection with certain pragmatic enrichments. Second, we will defend a pluralist thesis according to which pragmatics has an important role for capturing the inferential role of logical vocabulary, both of the notions of `follows from' and the logical constants, although classical logic preserves truth and captures their literal meaning. In sum, we defend a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate translations from natural language to formal languages, arguing that more than one translation is legitimate for logical vocabulary, which makes it possible to adopt more than one logic.