A non-cooperative bargaining procedure generalising the kalai-smorodinsky bargaining solution to ntu games

  1. BERGANTIÑOS, GUSTAVO 2
  2. CASAS-MÉNDEZ, BALBINA 3
  3. VÁZQUEZ-BRAGE, MARGARITA 1
  1. 1 Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Informatics, University of La Coruña, 15071 La Coruña, Spain
  2. 2 Department of Statistics and OR, Faculty of Economics, University of Vigo, 36271 Vigo, Pontevedra, Spain
  3. 3 Department of Statistics and OR, Faculty of Mathematics, University of Santiago, 15771 Santiago de Compostela, Spain
Zeitschrift:
International Game Theory Review

ISSN: 0219-1989 1793-6675

Datum der Publikation: 2000

Ausgabe: 02

Nummer: 04

Seiten: 273-286

Art: Artikel

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198900000226 GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen Access editor

Andere Publikationen in: International Game Theory Review

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