The indispensability argument and the nature of mathematical objects

  1. Plebani, Matteo
Revista:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Ano de publicación: 2018

Volume: 33

Número: 2

Páxinas: 249-263

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.17613 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Outras publicacións en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Resumo

Se contrastan dos concepciones de la naturaleza de los objetos matemáticos: la concepción de los objetos matemáticos como objetos preconcebidos (Yablo 2010), y el platonismo de deber fuerte (Knowles 2015). Se argumenta que algunas de las tesis defendidas por los amigos del argumento de la indispensabilidad están en armonía con el platonismo de deber fuerte y en tensión con la concepción de los objetos matemáticos como objetos preconcebidos.

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Información de financiamento

* Many thanks to audiences in Santiago de Compostela, Munich and Pavia. This work has been fi-nanced by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER through the projects FFI2013-41415-P (The explanatory function of abstract objects: their nature and cognoscibility), FFI2017-82534-P (Abstract Objects: For and Against. A Neo-Carnapian Way Out) and through a Juan de la Cierva-formación fellowship (IJCI-2014-19943).

Financiadores

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