On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium

  1. Julio González-Díaz 2
  2. Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Málaga, España
  2. 2 Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, España
Revista:
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ISSN: 1863-8279,  1134-5764

Ano de publicación: 2014

Volume: 22

Número: 1

Páxinas: 128-143

Tipo: Artigo

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Resumo

Often, perfect Bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied “whenever possible.” We argue that there are situations in which it is not clear what “whenever possible” means. Then we provide an elementary definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.

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Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to Johannes Hörner and Carlos Pimienta for helpful comments. Julio González-Díaz acknowledges financial support from the European Commission through a Marie Curie fellowship and from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation and FEDER through project ECO2008-03484-C02-02. Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez acknowledges financial support from the Fulbright Programm, from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (FU2005-1173 and ECO2008-04424), and from the Junta de Andalucía (SEJ2007-2986 and SEJ2009-4794). The authors thank the hospitality of Northwestern University (CMS-EMS), where part of this research was carried out.

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