Putnam and contemporary fictionalism

  1. Martínez-Vidal, Concha
Revista:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Ano de publicación: 2018

Volume: 33

Número: 2

Páxinas: 165-181

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.17610 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Outras publicacións en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Resumo

Putnam rechaza haber suscrito el argumento conocido como «argumento de la indispensabilidad de Quine y Putnam». Considera que la contribución de la matemática a la física no tiene por qué interpretarse en términos platónicos sino en términos modales (Putnam 1975; Putnam 2012). En este trabajo se contrapone el argumento que Putnam sostiene haber defendido—y la posición filosófica que lo sustenta—, a ciertas concepciones ficcionalistas contemporáneas de la matemática aplicada. De ese análisis se concluye que la concepción de la aplicabilidad de la matemática que subyace a la propuesta de Putnam coincide en muchos aspectos con las concepciones ficcionalistas analizadas

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* I presented a first version of the paper at the workshop that took place in November 2016, at the Uni-versity of Santiago de Compostela “Updating Indispensabilities: Hilary Putnam in Memoriam.” I would like to thank Mary Leng, Otávio Bueno, Susan Vineberg, Sorin Bangu, José Miguel Sagüillo and Matteo Plebani for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees of Theoria for their helpful comments on a second version. They really contributed to improve the result. Finally, I would like to thank Mary Leng for her contribution to the edition of this monographic sec-tion and M.ª José Garcia Encinas (Theoria’s editor) for her support and patience throughout the proc-ess. The research was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competititivity and FEDER under projects FFI2013-41415-P, FFI2017-82534-P. 1 For instance, Colyvan 2001; Field 2001, 329.

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