Large buyers, preferential treatment and cartel stability

  1. Manel Antelo 1
  2. Lluís Bru 2
  1. 1 Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
    info

    Universidade de Santiago de Compostela

    Santiago de Compostela, España

    ROR https://ror.org/030eybx10

  2. 2 Universitat de les Illes Balears
    info

    Universitat de les Illes Balears

    Palma, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03e10x626

Revista:
Documentos de Traballo. Análise Económica

ISSN: 1138-0713

Ano de publicación: 2013

Número: 51

Páxinas: 1-29

Tipo: Documento de traballo

Outras publicacións en: Documentos de Traballo. Análise Económica

Resumo

Bilateral deals for large clients or key account management (henceforth KAM) is traditionally justified in terms of the importance of a long-term association between a firm and such clients. However, in this paper we offer a different rationale for a seller to apply KAM to its large buyers. When facing large buyers, a firm can use KAM to deal with such buyers -but not to small individual buyers- in order to segment the market, charge higher prices to non-KAM buyers, and increase its profits. Paradoxically, the implementation of KAM by the seller makes it advantageous for customers to belong to a buyer group, thereby eliminating the instability that would otherwise plague the creation of the group. The formation of a buyer group thus ultimately depends on the pressure it puts upon the seller to resort to KAM to segment the market.