Construction and "worldmaking"the significance of Nelson Goodman's pluralism
ISSN: 0495-4548
Ano de publicación: 2009
Volume: 24
Número: 65
Páxinas: 213-225
Tipo: Artigo
Outras publicacións en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science
Resumo
In the present paper, I try to defend a coherent interpretation of Goodman�s relativism by responding to the main objections of the critics. I also discuss the significance of his pluralism by relating it to the notion of construction. This will show the relevance of Goodman�s philosophy for the present days.
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