A focal-point solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure

1. Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo
2. Vidal Puga, Juan José
3. Fiestras Janeiro, Gloria
4. Casas Méndez, Balbina Virginia

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Zusammenfassung

In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of NTU games with coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in Chae and Heidhues (2004) and Vidal-Puga (2005). Several axiomatic characterizations and a noncooperative mechanism are proposed.

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