Difusión dinámica dunha innovación drástica

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to study the licensing process of a drastic innovation in a fourfold characterised framework. Namely, the innovation has been obtained and patentad by a research Jab (principal) which is not be able to exploit it by itsell, so it is compelled lo transfer it -through licensing- to finns (agents) with productiva capacity; the technology lasts lar several periods; the highesl number ol licences to be granted per period is given; and there is asymmetric infomation over the economic value of the innovation between the owner and the users. In this setting, we find that the tradeoff between the sampting effect and lhe dissipalion effect defines the efficient dynamic market structure to exploit the patent, from an integrated viewpoint. Having defined the (dynamic) first best allocation at the patent, we also show that it is always implementable through fixed fee contracts. Finally, it is shown that the socially optimal dynamic allocation of the patent conslsts of diffusing it at maximum from the lirst period by granting the highest number of licenses. Hence, a shorter patent tenght is, in this setling, a welfare improve policy of technological development