Normativity and its vindicationsthe case of logic
ISSN: 0495-4548
Ano de publicación: 2004
Volume: 19
Número: 50
Páxinas: 191-206
Tipo: Artigo
Outras publicacións en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science
Resumo
Physical laws are irresistible. Logical rules are not. That is why logic is said to be normative. Given a system of logic we have a Norma, a standard of correctness. The problem is that we need another Norma to establish when the standard of correctness is to be applied. Subsequently we start by clarifying the senses in which the term "logic" and the term "normativity" are being used. Then we explore two different epistemologies for logic to see the sort of defence of the normativity of logic they allow for; if any. The analysis concentrates on the case of classical logic. In particular the issue will be appraised from the perspective put forward by the epistemology based on the methodology of wide reflective equilibrium and the scientific one underlying the view of logic as model.
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